The justifications for the economic loss doctrine do not exist in the home construction context, as the courts in David, Coker, and Rinehart properly recognized. However, each case raises questions about the scope of the doctrine in the home construction context and which economic loss claims a homeowner can bring in tort. These questions need to be addressed to ensure that the doctrine is applied correctly in the future.
This Comment analyzes the development of the economic loss doctrine in Kansas and the impact of these three recent cases. Although the cases seem logical in their limited holdings, they each create problems regarding the limitation of the doctrine outside the home construction context, the further blurring of the line between warranty and tort law, and the scope of tort liability for home construction defects. However, Kansas courts can begin to fix these problems by doing two things. First, Kansas courts should explicitly incorporate the independent duty rule into their economic loss doctrine analysis. Second, Kansas courts should consider several factorsthe gravity of harm of the defect, the bargaining positions of the parties, the nature of the claim's source as a service or a product, and whether the defect creates a non-economic risk of harm-to determine which home construction economic loss claims warrant recovery in tort.
Part II of this Comment explores the development of the economic loss doctrine in the United States and Kansas. First, it illustrates the development of the doctrine throughout the United States by explaining the doctrine's expansion and the ways in which courts have attempted to limit its scope through the creation of various exceptions. Part II also explores the development of the doctrine in Kansas courts, first with its adoption in the products liability context and then with its expansion into construction cases. Part III analyzes the three recent cases and discusses the ways in which the courts properly limited the doctrine. Part III also analyzes three specific problems that the recent Kansas cases created. Finally, this Comment explores the solutions Kansas courts can apply to begin to fix these problems. 
II. BACKGROUND

A. Development of the Economic Loss Doctrine in the United States
The Introduction of Tort Law to Products Liability and the Response by the Economic Loss Doctrine
The economic loss doctrine developed in the context of products liability law. 13 In the early twentieth century, consumers injured by defective products could recover under negligence law and warranty law. However, both of these claims were often defeated by contractual warranty disclaimers or by the privity limitation, thereby creating harsh results for consumers.
14 Traditional warranty law placed two major limitations on recovery by consumers of defective products. First, throughout the first half of the twentieth century, enforcement of warranty disclaimers prevented consumers from successfully asserting breach of warranty actions to recover damages caused by defective products. 15 Product manufacturers and sellers could disclaim all liability, some liability, or limit the availability of certain remedies. 16 Manufacturers and sellers of defective goods could thereby prevent liability if the manufacturer or seller successfully disclaimed liability. 17 Second, courts required contractual privity between the consumer )) (explaining that "the economic loss doctrine was developed in product liability cases").
14. See Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 44, 44 (1955) (stating that the privity doctrine "was well adapted to protect the manufacturer from burdens on his activity, but it did so at the expense of the victims of his mistakes," and that products liability law developed in response "to ever-growing pressure for protection of the consumer, coupled with a realization that liability would not unduly inhibit the enterprise of manufacturers"). 17. See Gearing v. Berkson, 111 N.E. 785, 223 Mass. 257, 260 (Mass. 1916) (dismissing a claim for unwholesome pork chops because of "the absence both of an implied warranty and of negligence on the part of the defendants"). and the party it was suing in negligence. 18 This defeated tort claims by consumers who did not directly buy the product from the defendant. Consumer buyers were often left to sue insolvent retailers rather than the deep-pocketed manufacturers who created the defective product. 19 The adoption of strict liability for defective products came as a response to the perception that the limitations of traditional negligence and warranty law imposed too great of a burden on consumers. 20 Courts first began to adopt strict liability in the context of defective or unwholesome foods. 21 In 1963, the Supreme Court of California held in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products that " [a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." 22 The court stated that the doctrine was necessary "to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." 23 After Greenman, the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted strict liability for the defective products rule in §402A. 24 These two developments prompted states to adopt strict liability for defective products, which eliminated many of the defenses available under traditional negligence and warranty law. 25 The economic loss doctrine therefore arose in the context of the competing theories of warranty and products liability law, and attempted to draw a line of demarcation between 18. James Jr., supra note 14, at 44 (explaining that courts at the beginning of the 20th century were reluctant to find liability for defective products in the absence of contractual privity).
19. See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Union Portland Cement Co., 205 P. 1118 , 1119 (Idaho 1922) (denying recovery to plaintiff who had no "contractual relation" with the manufacturer it sued). See also James Jr., supra note 14, at 44 (explaining that at the beginning of the twentieth century, recovery was "limited to the parties" of a contract, rather than "those who might foreseeably be injured" by use of the defective product).
20. See Prosser, supra note 15, at 1131-33 (stating that the general enforcement of warranty disclaimers in products cases places "dangerous power . . . in the hands of the seller"); James Jr., supra note 14, at 44 (stating that the privity requirement helped "protect the manufacturer from burdens on his activity, but it did so at the expense of the victims of his mistakes").
21. Prosser, supra note 15, at 1104 (citations omitted) (explaining that early American courts "imposed strict liability upon the seller of food, in favor of his purchaser, as 'a principle, not only salutary, but necessary to the preservation of health and life'").
22 
27
The economic loss doctrine was first officially adopted by the California Supreme Court in the 1965 case of Seely v. White Motor Co. 28 The plaintiff, Seely, bought a truck manufactured by White Motor Co., and the truck overturned when the brakes malfunctioned.
29
Although Seely was not physically injured, he brought claims of "breach of express warranty, breach of warranty of fitness for purpose of intended use, breach of contract" and strict liability in tort for the purchase price, lost profits, and repairs to the truck. 30 Seely initially brought these claims against White Motor Co. and the retailer, Southern Truck Sales, but dismissed the action against Southern. 31 The California Supreme Court affirmed lower court rulings permitting warranty recovery for the purchase price and lost profits-but not the repairs-and denying tort liability.
32
In affirming the court of appeals, the supreme court explained the economic loss doctrine:
[Defendant] can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. At the time of this case California had adopted the UCC, which states that an express warranty is created "if the natural tendency of [an] affirmation of promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon." Seely, 403 P.2d at 148 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1732 (repealed 1979)). White Motor Co. limited the express warranty to repair and replacement, and the court found that White breached this warranty by failing to repair the truck. Seely, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 808. Turning to plaintiff's strict liability claim, the court noted that the trial court failed to make a ruling on this issue. Id. at 810. However, the court held this was not reversible error because product liability claims were recoverable only for personal injury claims. Id. at 812. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the court of appeals ruling. Seely, 403 P.2d at 152. The supreme court first upheld the award of damages for the purchase price and lost profits based on the breach of express warranty, because these losses directly resulted "in the ordinary course of events from the breach of warranty." Id. at 148-49. The court also affirmed the denial of Seely's breach of warranty claim for repair costs because Seely failed to show causation. Id. at 152.
He cannot be held for the level of performance of his products in the consumer's business unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet the consumer's demands. 33 In other words, economic losses to the consumer caused by the product's performance in the consumer's business are a matter for agreement, or warranty, while physical injuries are for "a standard of safety" imposed by the law regardless of the agreement. The court worried that if a manufacturer was held strictly liable in tort for economic damages, thereby preventing the manufacturer from defining the scope of its liability through warranty, "[t]he manufacturer would be liable for damages of unknown and unlimited scope." 34 The court therefore held that a plaintiff could recover in tort for physical injury and property damage, but not for "his economic expectations."
35 Applying this doctrine to Seely's claim, the court found that the claim for cost of repairs was for physical damage to the truck, and therefore was recoverable on a strict liability theory. 36 However, because Seely failed to show "that the defect caused the physical damage [to] the truck," he could not recover on this basis. 37 Dissenting, Justice Peters argued that because the court found White Motor Co. liable on the breach of warranty claim, it was unnecessary for the court to decide that Seely could not recover on his strict liability claim. 38 Therefore, Justice Peters argued, "[e]verything said by the majority on that subject is obviously dicta."
39 Despite Justice Peters's concerns, the Seely Court's explanation of the economic loss doctrine has been continuously cited as the first formal adoption of the doctrine. 42 This case focused primarily on proximate cause, but there was a strong undercurrent of concern for the unlimited liability that would ensue if law attempted to hold the negligent tortfeasor liable for all harms to property:
A man may insure his own house or his own furniture, but he cannot insure his neighbor's building or furniture, for the reason that he has no interest in them. To hold that the owner must not only meet his own loss by fire, but that he must guarantee the security of his neighbors on both sides, and to an unlimited extent, would be to create a liability which would be the destruction of all civilized society 43 Fear of unlimited liability in economic loss cases continued after Seely. Courts felt that allowing tort recovery-or even recovery without privity-in cases of economic loss would lead to liability on an unmanageable scale. 44 The 1968 negligence case Kinsman II involved a cargo ship that broke free from its moorings, struck a second ship, and crashed into a bridge, causing flooding when the two ships and the bridge formed a dam. 45 The court denied recovery to plaintiffs, holding that the economic losses they incurred as a result of the flooding-based on an inability "to move traffic along the river"-were too remote from the negligence. 46 The court reasoned that the prevention of unlimited liability required it to draw a line barring claims that were "too tenuous and remote to permit recovery." 47 Courts have continued to cite the policies of unlimited liability and foreseeability as a driving factor in not allowing tort recovery for economic losses. 48 In contrast, courts have less concern about unlimited liability for economic loss in warranty actions 41 . Seely, 403 P.2d at 150-51 (discussing the concern for unlimited liability 50 East River, charterers of a supertanker, brought an action against Transamerica Delaval for negligence, strict liability, breach of contract and breach of warranty after a turbine installed by Transamerica malfunctioned. 51 The only damage was to the turbines themselves.
52
After Transamerica submitted a statute of limitations defense, East River amended its complaint and brought only the negligence and strict liability claims.
53 Therefore, the Court had to "decide whether a cause of action in tort is stated when a defective product purchased in a commercial transaction malfunctions, injuring only the product itself and causing purely economic loss." 54 The East River Court explained the spectrum of holdings on economic loss cases at the time. A majority of courts had adopted the economic loss doctrine, denying recovery in tort for claims of purely economic loss. 55 A minority of courts had allowed economic loss recovery based on the theory that a distinction between physical and economic damage is "arbitrary. However, the Court stated that a main reason for adopting the economic loss doctrine was to prevent the deterioration of the line between warranty and tort law. 59 The Court continued to emphasize this theme throughout its opinion.
60
At one point, the Court famously declared that, without the economic loss doctrine, "contract law would drown in a sea of tort." 61 Therefore, the Court adopted the following doctrine: "whether stated in negligence or strict liability, no products-liability claim lies in admiralty when the only injury claimed is economic loss."
62
Although the East River Court emphasized the distinction between tort and warranty law as its main reason for adopting the economic loss doctrine, it discussed other policy factors that influenced its decision. First, the Court highlighted the business nature of the transaction, as opposed to a consumer transaction, as a reason society had a lesser interest in ensuring the buyer's recovery beyond the terms of a warranty. 63 The Court also stated its concern with the potential for unlimited liability without the economic loss doctrine. 64 Finally, the Court found that adoption of the doctrine promoted efficient bargaining between parties, especially when the parties held equal bargaining power. 65 These secondary policies later influenced the expansion of the doctrine into a variety of contexts. 67 In addition, courts began to expand the doctrine beyond this context based on the policies set forth in East River and other early cases.
Expansion of the Doctrine After East River
First, courts extended the economic loss doctrine to deny recovery in cases in which a product caused damage to a purchaser's property, as in East River. 68 These courts reasoned that, if the damage was within the contemplation of the parties, the proper method of risk allocation was the parties' own bargaining and therefore warranty, not tort, was the proper governing law.
69
Courts also expanded the doctrine by applying it to the construction context.
70
Although these cases usually involved claims based on both products and services, the courts found that the policies announced in East River and other early cases applied with equal force. 71 Many jurisdictions applied the doctrine in cases outside the business context, arguing that the proper distinction was between economic and physical damages rather than business and consumer contracts. 72 Other courts began applying the doctrine damage alleged is to the product itself." he rule developed as a way of enforcing the dictates of privity in product liability law" and that "the majority of cases enunciating the economic loss rule have arisen in the context of product liability").
68. Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Mich. 1992) (economic loss doctrine barred plaintiffs' claims based on allegedly defective milking product that caused injury to plaintiffs' cows); Dakota Gasification Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., a Div. of Amcord, Inc., 91 F.3d 1094, 1100-01 (8th Cir. 1996) (economic loss doctrine applied to a claim by the owner of a natural gas production plant against a supplier of steel structural components for damage caused to owner's plant).
69. Eric R. Skinner, The Expansion of the Economic Loss Doctrine: Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, Inc., 1993 DET. C.L. REV. 1007, 1007-08 (1993) (describing the expansion of the doctrine to situations in which "such damage is found to have been within the contemplation of the parties at the time of bargaining").
70. E.g., Berschauer/Phillips Const. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 992 (Wash. 1994) (deciding to "maintain the fundamental boundaries of tort and contract law by limiting the recovery of economic loss due to construction delays to the remedies provided by contract").
71. See id. (discussing the concern for unlimited liability as a factor in the court's decision); see also Wausau Paper Mills Co. v. Chas. T. Main, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 968, 974 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (stating that the plaintiff's economic loss through construction services was simply a failure "of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its bargain-traditionally the core concern of contract law").
72. )) (noting that the Michigan Supreme Court had previously held that a consumer plaintiff could not bring tort claims for economic losses without allegations and proof of the tortious conduct that is independent of the to claims involving negligence and claims within the context of services rather than products.
73
B. Limitation of the Economic Loss Doctrine Through the Creation of Exceptions
While some courts continued to expand application of the economic loss doctrine, others began to use the same policies driving expansion to limit the doctrine. For example, the economic loss doctrine does not apply to damage that a product causes to a purchaser's "other property." 74 This exception was adopted because courts treat personal injury and property damage alike. 75 However, the "other property" exception has created significant confusion among courts having to distinguish between the purchaser's "other property" and "component parts" of the product at issue. 76 Generally, courts have held that something that is part of the integrated structure of an item or is part of the finished product is a "component part" of the product rather than "other property." 77 Additionally, some jurisdictions allow tort recovery in cases involving services rather than products. 78 According to these courts, the justification for this exception lies with the underlying purposes of warranty and tort law. 79 Because the UCC sales chapter applies to sales of goods, warranty law is more appropriate where goods are involved, whereas tort law is more contract breach).
73. See A. Dean Bennett, The "Unique Circumstances" Exception to the Economic Loss Doctrine, ADVOC. (IDAHO), March/Apr. 2009, at 26, 26 (providing that "the rule is now applied in negligence cases where the concept of proximate cause has traditionally been the gatekeeper to a plaintiff's recovery," and is also applied to "the poor performance of services").
74. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 867 (1986) (stating that a manufacturer's duty of care extends to "protection against property damage"). applicable in the services context. 80 Courts also cite the informal nature of service contracts as a reason not to extend the economic loss doctrine to this context.
81
Some courts also allow tort recovery for economic losses in fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. Courts generally take one of three approaches when faced with economic loss claims based on fraud. 82 First, some courts apply the economic loss doctrine in its usual fashion and hold that the defrauded party's claim is solely contract, not tort. 83 Second, some courts allow tort claims for economic losses in cases of fraud. 84 Finally, an intermediate rule, adopted by some courts, allows tort recovery when "the fraud is not interwoven with the quality or character of the goods or otherwise involves performance of the contract." 85 Another set of courts also allows tort recovery in cases of negligent misrepresentation. 86 These courts cite the rationale that because both fraud and negligent misrepresentation may provide bases for liability independent of a contract, the exception should apply to both forms of misrepresentation.
87 Therefore, the fraud and negligent misrepresentation exceptions place further limitations on the economic loss doctrine.
The independent duty rule acts as another common limitation on the economic loss doctrine. The independent duty rule allows economic loss claims in tort when the duty can be traced to a source other than the parties' contract.
88
When the duty underlying a claim can be traced to both a 80. See id. (stating that because UCC Article 2 applies to goods, it is necessary to determine whether goods or services are more predominant in a claim); see also Gray, supra note 4, at 1535 (explaining that one argument against applying the economic loss doctrine to services claims is that "there is no equivalent to the Uniform Commercial Code for the interactions of parties in a service industry").
81. See Gray, supra note 4, at 1535 ("[A]pplying the doctrine to limit remedies is discouraged by the fact that many service contracts are oral."); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462, 470 (Wis. 2004) ("Because of the informal circumstances surrounding most oral contracts for services, the policy provisions underpinning the application of the economic loss doctrine do not readily apply.").
82. Ralph C. 89 However, when the duty can be found in tort independent of the parties' contract terms, the plaintiff's economic loss claims are allowed in tort. 90 For example, if the parties did not include in their contract the duty to refrain from making misrepresentations, the tort duty to do so would apply. The independent duty rule has gained wide acceptance in recent years, 91 but courts and commentators continue to debate the scope of this exception.
92
C. Development of the Economic Loss Doctrine in Kansas
The Kansas Court of Appeals formally adopted the economic loss doctrine in 1998 in Koss Construction v. Caterpillar, Inc. 93 The court based its adoption of the doctrine primarily on the application of the doctrine by other jurisdictions and its own view that East River represented a "straightforward" and "predictable" approach. 94 However, before this formal adoption of the doctrine, several Kansas cases recognized the economic loss doctrine and its policies.
95 These cases applied the doctrine here is a consensus that the breach of a purely contractual duty is not actionable as a tort if the only consequences are economic losses.").
90. See id. at 539-40 (explaining that application of the independent duty rule means that economic loss claims are barred " [o] nly where a contract expressly or by necessary implication elects to replace tort principles actually or potentially establishing an independent duty"); see also DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 615 (2013) ("[T]he tort duty, to be actionable, must not be 'interwoven' with the contract.").
91. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 90, at § 615 n.10.50 ("This 'independent duty rule' appears to be gaining some momentum.").
92. See Johnson, supra note 40, at 539-40 (explaining that some courts bar claims based on independent tort duties if the duty relates "to the subject matter of an existing contract, [ and its policies without explicitly adopting it. 96 The Koss Construction court's approach can therefore be seen as the explicit adoption of a policy that the Kansas courts had been applying throughout the previous decade.
Like the courts in East River and Seely, the Koss Construction court first adopted the doctrine in the business product liability context. 97 However, Kansas courts soon extended the doctrine to areas such as consumer purchases, services, and construction. 98 This expansion set the stage for the courts to consider the limitations of the growing doctrine. This Comment will first discuss expansion of the economic loss doctrine in Kansas, then turn to the limitations imposed on it.
Application in Consumer and Business Products Cases
In Koss Construction, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a vibratory roller after the roller was damaged by a defective part. 99 The plaintiff sued under theories of breach of implied warranty of merchantability, negligence, and strict liability. 100 The district court dismissed the breach of warranty claim because Koss Construction lacked privity with Caterpillar. 101 The district court also dismissed the plaintiff's claims for negligence and strict liability, citing the economic loss doctrine. 102 In its opinion affirming the district court, the court of appeals noted the persuasiveness of the East River decision and the policy goal of establishing a "logical demarcation between cases properly pursued as tort actions and those which are warranty claims."
103 Because economic losses are "traditionally the core concern of contract law," the court held that such losses should not be recoverable in tort. The Jordan case involved claims made by a farmer's insurer when the farmer's combine caught fire because of an engine defect. 106 The insurer brought claims against the manufacturer based on theories of breach of implied warranty, strict liability, and negligence. 107 Applying the economic loss doctrine from Koss, the trial court dismissed the insurer's claims. 108 The court of appeals affirmed the denial of each of the insurer's claims. 109 The insurer argued that the engine was other property rather than a component part, and therefore the economic loss doctrine should not apply to bar the claim. 110 However, the court of appeals found that the engine was a component part of the combine, and therefore the doctrine barred the claims. 111 The court effectively extended the doctrine in two ways. First, it carried the doctrine outside the business context and applied it to a consumer claim.
112 Second, although the court did not dismiss the other property exception, the court limited its application with its view of the engine as a component part. 113 This case therefore represented the beginning of the economic loss doctrine's expansion in Kansas.
Application in the Construction Context
After Jordan, the Kansas courts extended the economic loss doctrine to the construction context through a series of cases. Specialty Products, Inc.
114
In Northwest Arkansas, Northwest brought contract and product liability claims against Summit, which allegedly manufactured defective cement powder. 115 The court considered whether the other property exception applied to the defective cement used by Northwest to build a cement wall. 116 The court found that in construction cases, an item must be distinguished as other property or part of an "integrated system" of a structure.
117 If the item is part of an integrated system, then the economic loss doctrine bars the tort claim of damage to the item. 118 The court noted several cases in other jurisdictions finding that defective cement was part of an integrated system, and then applied the economic loss doctrine to bar Northwest's claim.
119
The Kansas Court of Appeals next considered the scope of the economic loss doctrine in the construction case Prendiville v. Contemporary Homes, Inc.
120 In Prendiville, a homeowner brought claims of breach of warranty, negligence, and violation of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act against the project's contractor after a defect caused flooding in the homeowner's basement. 121 The defendant filed a summary judgment motion, and the district court denied the defendant's motion on the breach of warranty and Consumer Protection Act claims. 122 The court granted the motion on the negligence claim, citing the economic loss doctrine.
123
On appeal, the homeowner argued that the economic loss doctrine should not apply for two reasons.
124 First, the construction of a house constituted a service rather than a product, and therefore the court should allow tort recovery. 125 Second, the doctrine should not apply in residential cases because of the relative inexperience of the buyers.
126
The court rejected both arguments.
127
Although noting a split of authorities outside Kansas on the application of the doctrine to residential construction cases, the court held that the economic loss doctrine applied whether or not the claim was based on a service or product. 128 It also found that the doctrine should apply equally to residential and business parties, and that, if an exception for homeowners was to be made, it was up to the legislature to do so. 129 The court focused on the policies underlying the doctrine, such as respecting the bargaining process of the parties:
If Prendiville is allowed to proceed with his negligence claim, this would essentially nullify the express warranty agreed upon by the parties. The warranty specifically allowed Prendiville to make claims regarding defects or deficiencies in the house for 1 year following the issuance of the warranty. The effect of allowing Prendiville to proceed on the negligence claim is to extend the defendants' potential for liability for a greater period of time.
130
The concern for unlimited liability and the blurring of lines between warranty and tort law fueled the court's extension of the doctrine to this area. These cases effectively halted the expansion of the doctrine, overruled precedent, and opened the door to tort recovery in economic loss home construction cases. 134 Although the cases properly recognized that the justifications for the economic loss doctrine do not exist in the home construction context, the cases created several problems for future application of the doctrine.
With the advent of tort liability for some economic loss claims in Kansas, these cases introduced several problems for future application of the doctrine. First, it is unclear whether the limitations of these cases will be expanded outside the home construction context. Although reform of the doctrine in other areas does not seem likely now, several problems may arise if the same limitations are applied outside the home construction context. Second, by allowing tort liability for economic loss claims, these cases further complicate the lines between tort and warranty law. Finally, these cases create scope of liability issues regarding which home defect claims should be actionable in tort. The Kansas courts can reduce the potential for these problems by incorporating the independent duty rule and several factors into their economic loss doctrine analysis. The David, Coker, and Rinehart courts touched on the independent duty rule and some of these factors but did not explicitly adopt them. The courts can form a more predictable and accurate analysis by adopting these solutions in future economic loss cases.
A. The Three Kansas Economic Loss Cases
After more than a decade of the doctrine's expansion, three Kansas cases changed the application of the economic loss doctrine in the home construction context. liability for economic loss claims in at least one context and began discussing exceptions to the doctrine that might limit its application in other contexts.
David v. Hett
In 2011, the Supreme Court of Kansas reconsidered the economic loss doctrine in the home construction context in David v. Hett. 135 In David, the homeowners brought claims of "breach of contract, negligence, fraud, fraudulent concealment, and violation of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act" against their contractor after they experienced settling in their home. 136 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the contractor on all claims. 137 The court found that the statute of limitations barred the homeowners' contract and Consumer Protection Act claims and that the homeowners failed to prove the elements of their fraud claims. 138 The district court held that the economic loss doctrine barred the negligence claim, and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed.
139 Before David, the bright-line rule established in Prendiville barred economic loss claims in construction cases. 140 The David court reversed this rule and held that the economic loss doctrine did not bar homeowners' claims against a contractor for negligently performed construction services.
141
The court explained several policy reasons for allowing tort recovery of economic losses in residential construction cases. 142 First, the David court addressed the policy rationale that warranty remedies are sufficient when the only damage is to a product itself. 143 The court emphasized the nature of the claim in this case as involving a service rather than a product, and found this distinction important in light of the 135 142. Id. at 1113 ("We find these policy rationales do not readily apply to parties to a home construction contract and should not cause us to revise our existing caselaw.").
143. Id.
warranty policy. 144 The court explained that, although this policy seemed appropriate in the context of products cases, it was inappropriate for services cases. 145 The Kansas Uniform Commercial Code for sales applies "to transactions in goods, not services," and because of this the court found that warranty law did not provide a remedy for services claims. 146 The court therefore recognized the services exception as an effective limitation on the economic loss doctrine without explicitly adopting it. 147 Additionally, the court found that the exception's rationale "is easily applied to residential construction contracts such as the one at issue in this case." 148 Several jurisdictions have endorsed this view and allowed tort recovery for services-especially professional services-in economic loss cases. 149 However, a significant number of courts have expressly rejected the services exception as an inadequate basis for distinction in economic loss cases. 150 These courts find that the economic loss doctrine has just as high an interest in precluding services tort claims-at least professional services tort claims-as it does precluding products tort claims. 151 This argument seems to have significant weight in Kansas. Although services are not explicitly covered by the Kansas Uniform Commercial Code, most services are covered by warranty law through the duty to perform services "in a workmanlike manner." 152 However, the implied warranty to perform services in a workmanlike manner does not apply in Kansas to all services, such as professional services by a doctor or lawyer, so tort recovery for 144 ) (holding that in the absence of a professional relationship, "there was no special duty of care created beyond the terms of the construction contract and no exception to the economic-loss rule applies").
152. See Zenda Grain & Supply Co. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 894 P.2d 881, 890 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) ("The law in Kansas and, indeed, the general rule throughout the United States is that there is 'implied in every contract for work or services a duty to perform it skillfully, carefully, diligently, and in a workmanlike manner.'"). economic loss caused by these services may be appropriate. 153 In the absence of warranty law in these professional services cases, tort recovery may be justified. Although the services exception may not be an adequate basis for distinction in itself, it can still help define the line between tort and warranty law.
The David court also addressed the nature of the homeowners' claim in light of the warranty rationale. 154 The court stated that because home defects are often discovered after the warranty time period has expired, warranty law offers little protection to homeowners. 155 Because of these reasons, the court found that the warranty rationale for the doctrine did not apply in this case. 156 This conclusion marks a sharp contrast from that in Prendiville, where the court did not even consider the statute of limitations that warranty law imposes.
157
The court next considered the policy of promoting bargaining among parties in the home construction context. 158 The court found this policy inapplicable to residential construction cases because of the often-disparate bargaining positions of the parties. 159 The court found that applying the doctrine in this case would unilaterally benefit the contractor. 160 Therefore, the court found the nature of the contract-between a consumer and a business-important in determining the applicability of the doctrine. 161 This conclusion also diverges from Prendiville, where the court rejected the homeowner's argument that due to "the inexperience of a buyer in negotiating contracts, a buyer should not be precluded from maintaining a negligence action against a contractor." 162 Finally, the court found the economic loss doctrine's focus on 153. Tamarac Dev. Co. v. Delamater, Freund & Assocs., P.A., 675 P.2d 361, 365 (Kan. 1984) (explaining that "it can be said certain professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, are not subject" to the implied warranty to perform services in a workmanlike manner, but can be liable in tort for malpractice).
154. consequences troubling in the residential construction context. 163 Under the doctrine, a contractor would be liable in tort only if an economic harm turned into a physical injury. 164 Tort liability under the doctrine simply turns on a matter of timing. 165 A homeowner who discovers a construction defect pre-injury will save her contractor from tort liability. 166 This conclusion indicates that the court considered the gravity of harm that a defect causes, even if the defect ultimately causes only economic loss. This analysis was also missing in previous economic loss cases in Kansas. 167 For these policy reasons, the supreme court overruled Prendiville's application of the economic loss doctrine to residential construction claims. 169 Coker involved a claim by a homeowner after a water line separated and caused cracking in the home's foundation and walls. 170 The homeowner sued the seller of the home for breach of express warranty and sued the plumber who caused the damage for negligence.
171
The district court dismissed the claim against the plumber based on the economic loss doctrine. 172 The court of appeals reversed the dismissal and reiterated the reasoning in David, holding that the homeowner's negligence claim against the plumber was not barred by the economic loss doctrine. 173 Therefore, even though the terms of the contract might have prevented the homeowner from seeking various remedies, the homeowner would be able to recover from the construction company if the homeowner could prove a breach of a duty "independent of the underlying construction contract." 174 163. David, 270 P.3d at 1114 ("Finally, we agree with the analysis in Kennedy in which the South Carolina Supreme Court found the economic loss doctrine's application to home construction troubling because it focused on the consequence or damages, rather than the duty breached.").
164. Because the court found that the plumber who installed the water line owed the homeowner an independent legal duty "to perform plumbing services without causing economic injury to third parties," the court allowed the homeowner's negligence claim against the plumber. 175 As discussed above, courts in various jurisdictions have adopted this independent duty analysis in economic loss cases. 176 However, in previous Kansas cases the courts did not consider whether there was a tort duty independent of the terms of a contract. In Rinehart, the owners of a building sued the construction company on theories of breach of contract, breach of warranty, violation of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act, and negligent misrepresentation. 178 The owners planned to use the building both as a home and for their cellophane slitting business, but they claimed that the contractor "misrepresented that the building complied with the plans and specifications." 179 The jury awarded damages to the owners on each of the theories. 180 The supreme court held that the economic loss doctrine does not apply to negligent misrepresentation claims.
181
The court explained economic loss recovery in negligent misrepresentation claims based on the same rationale in David-that warranty law does not govern or provide an adequate remedy for negligent misrepresentation claims. 182 The court also stated that the effect of applying the doctrine in this case would be that parties would need to "enter a contract or risk having no rights at all."
183 Finally, the court found that, because negligent misrepresentation claims already have built-in limitations on liability, it is not necessary to apply the doctrine to these cases to restrict 175 downstream liability. 184 For these reasons the court adopted the bright-line rule that the economic loss doctrine does not bar negligent misrepresentation claims. 185 David, Coker, and Rinehart represent a marked shift in approach to the economic loss doctrine. For the first time since the doctrine's adoption in Kansas, the courts held that the doctrine did not apply to cases in which the plaintiffs claimed only economic losses. The courts also for the first time endorsed several exceptions and policies that limit the doctrine. David and Coker recognized the independent duty rule and the bargaining positions of the parties, and Rinehart adopted the bright-line rule that the doctrine does not apply to negligent misrepresentation claims. 186 These cases opened the door to tort liability for economic loss claims at least in the residential construction context and raised issues as to the scope of liability allowed when only economic loss is claimed.
B. The Impact of the Three Kansas Cases
David, Coker, and Rinehart opened the door to tort liability in home construction economic loss cases in Kansas. Although the cases reached the correct conclusion in limiting the doctrine in the home construction context, this new approach creates problems for application of the doctrine in future cases.
The Kansas Courts Appropriately Limited the Economic Loss Doctrine in the Home Construction Context
These three cases properly limited the economic loss doctrine's application to the home construction context. The justifications for the economic loss doctrine do not exist in the home construction context. First, the nature of home construction claims is not well suited for the economic loss doctrine. 187 Warranty claims are not subject to the discovery rule. Therefore, home construction defects that cause only economic loss and are discovered after the warranty statute of limitations expires are not actionable. Second, as the court in David recognized, homeowners are typically inexperienced in negotiating the terms of a warranty.
189
Homeowners should not be prevented from bringing common law negligence claims that are not covered by the terms of their warranty. Finally, home construction claims often arise from conduct outside the terms of the parties' contract. 190 When this occurs, courts should not prevent a homeowner's independent negligence claims. For these reasons, the courts in David, Coker, and Rinehart properly found that the economic loss doctrine should not apply in home construction cases.
Problems the Recent Kansas Cases Created for Future Application of the Doctrine
The addition of David, Coker, and Rinehart to the economic loss doctrine landscape creates three distinct problems for future application of the doctrine in Kansas. First, it is unclear whether the courts intended to alter-by placing limitations on-the economic loss doctrine only in residential construction cases, or whether these cases signal the beginning of tort claims for economic loss in other contexts. The limitations these cases imposed on the doctrine cannot be applied as easily outside the home construction context, and allowing tort recovery in economic loss cases in other contexts may create scope of liability problems. Second, these cases seem to further complicate the distinction between warranty law and tort law claims. Finally, the scope of liability as to the types of home defects recoverable in tort creates problems for analysis of home construction economic loss claims. home construction service projects, and Rinehart allows such recovery in negligent misrepresentation claims within the same context. Each case is limited to the home construction context and does not explicitly alter the economic loss doctrine outside this context. However, it is unclear whether these limitations to the doctrine may in the future be applied outside the home construction context, and Rinehart explicitly leaves this question open.
191 If the courts begin to limit the economic loss doctrine outside the home construction context, the reasoning used by the recent cases for such limitations breaks down and potential problems with scope of liability arise.
In David and Coker, the courts addressed the economic loss issue in the context of services contracts involving homeowners.
192 These cases should, therefore, be viewed as limited to this context. If the cases are truly limited in this way, there is support for a professional services exception or a distinction based on consumers in the context of home construction cases.
193
The David and Coker courts each stated the rationales for excluding liability in these contexts-services are not covered by warranty law in Article 2 of the UCC and consumers typically have less bargaining power than business parties in the same situations. 194 Therefore, the courts' decisions seem logical when viewed in light of these exceptions.
However, if the Kansas courts alter their approach to the economic loss doctrine outside the context of residential construction cases, the exceptions that the courts rely on break down. In residential construction cases, it is already difficult to justify a distinction on the basis of differences between consumers and business parties. Some cases, including Rinehart, involve parties that could be characterized as either consumers or business entities.
195 If the courts begin to limit the doctrine in business transactions based on the same rationale, it can be even more difficult to make straightforward rules based on bargaining power because of the disparities in 191. Rinehart, 305 P.3d at 633 ("We leave for another day whether the doctrine should extend elsewhere.").
192. David, 270 P.3d at 1103 (economic loss claim involving service contract for excavation, basement, and concrete work); Coker, 304 P.3d at 691 (negligence claim based on service contract for plumbing work). 194. David, 270 P.3d at 1113-14; Coker, 304 P.3d at 694. 195. Rinehart, 305 P.3d at 625 (explaining that the plaintiffs planned to use the structure as both their home residence and business location).
bargaining power between smaller companies and large corporations. 196 Although the nature of the parties may be a proper distinction for application of the doctrine in the home construction context, this distinction is less useful in other contexts. Therefore, the rule explained in David and Coker seems simple at first, but quickly becomes more convoluted when applied to different sets of facts.
Allowing tort recovery for economic loss cases outside the home construction context also might create problems regarding the scope of tort liability. In the business context, economic damages can affect many parties. A negligently constructed foundation affects everyone in an office building, and pipes that burst in a strip mall might flood multiple businesses. In home construction cases usually only one party-the homeowner-brings a tort claim, thereby naturally limiting the potential sphere of liability. But the same cannot be said in the business context, and therefore the economic loss doctrine cannot as easily be limited in this area. Although the courts did not expressly state that they were prepared to expand the limitations outside the residential construction context, the courts did leave this question unanswered.
b. Blurring of Lines Between Warranty and Tort Law
These three cases effectively changed the way economic loss construction claims are viewed in Kansas. Each held that the specific economic loss claims might be recoverable in tort. 197 Courts and commentators have struggled for decades to delineate the line between warranty and tort law, and there likely is no clear line between the two. 198 However, in product and construction cases tort law has typically been characterized by its focus on personal or property damage, rather than on economic loss. 199 This is not to say that tort law has been completely reluctant to address economic losses. 200 Negligent misrepresentation provides a good example of a cause of action in tort that is primarily concerned with economic losses. 201 But when economic losses are involved and a claim includes both warranty and tort elements, the economic loss doctrine has attempted to draw a recognizable distinction between the two theories.
In each of these three cases, the claims could have been addressed through contract and were arguably better suited for contract law. 202 Allowing tort recovery in each of these cases therefore makes the distinction between warranty and tort law more convoluted. Contract law-and by extension, warranty law-focuses on agreements, and its core concern is ensuring that parties receive the benefit of their bargain. 203 In each of the three recent cases, the parties agreed to the terms of the service to be rendered-the construction or improvement of a house. 204 After the services were performed, the plaintiffs discovered conditions that did not conform to or were outside the scope of the parties' agreements. The damages in each case were not bodily harm or property damage, but economic losses. 205 Therefore, these claims were probably more suitable for consideration within the context of warranty law, and the plaintiffs recognized this by bringing breach of warranty and breach of contract claims in addition to tort claims in each case. 206 Each of the courts, however, found that the claims were subject to tort analysis in addition to warranty law and contract law analysis. 207 These findings are correct in that each claim had elements of tort as well as warranty law. But, by preventing the application of the economic loss doctrine, these cases made tort law applicable to economic loss cases in the construction context, which have traditionally been subject to warranty law. These cases opened the door to tort law analysis in the economic loss home construction context, and therefore the courts must now determine which home construction defects tort law is prepared to recognize.
c. The Unlimited Liability Problem in Home Construction Economic
Loss Cases
The main concern with opening up these home construction economic loss claims to tort law analysis is the potential for unlimited liability. Under warranty law, these claims would be subject to whatever limitations are imposed by the warranty. 208 Under a tort law analysis, however, the courts are free to impose liability whenever a proper basis for fault is found. 209 This opens the door to liability in a wide range of cases; liability is no longer limited to the terms of the warranty, but to the harms that tort law deems actionable. Whereas the parties might limit liability to certain items within a house through warranties, the rule in these cases allows liability for a leaking roof, a cracked wall, or anything else that is a foreseeable harm. The statutes of limitation in Kansas combined with the nature of residential construction claims curb the concern for unlimited liability as far as time and parties involved, but the scope of liability as far as the type of claims plaintiffs can bring is still unclear.
The potential for unlimited liability is less troubling in these home construction cases for two reasons. First, in Kansas the statute of limitations for torts after discovery is three years, and all claims are limited to ten years, thereby limiting the claims a homeowner can bring to within a decade. 210 Because of the statute of limitations, the builder does not need to worry about unlimited liability for an indeterminate time. Second, as noted above, the home construction context limits liability in a unique way as to the parties who will bring claims. In the residential context there is typically only one party making a claim, as opposed to other product liability cases, in which multiple buyers might make claims against a manufacturer. Therefore, the concern for extended liability to additional parties is also limited, at least in home construction cases.
However, it is still not clear what kind of claims a party in a construction context can make. If David's holding is interpreted broadly as limiting the economic loss doctrine in all residential construction defect cases, plaintiffs can bring claims in tort for any economic loss in the home construction context. 211 But this seems to extend the rule too far. Can plaintiffs bring a claim for small defects not addressed in the warranty if the defect is not discovered until eight or nine years after the project's completion? Or is there some sort of limitation the courts can place on these claims to ensure that the most troubling defects, such as cracks in a foundation, are addressed without opening the floodgates to every type of home defect being litigated? The issue therefore becomes not who or when courts want to protect through tort liability, but what claims should be actionable when only economic losses are involved. David, Rinehart, and Coker do not provide a clear answer to this problem, but guidance on the types of economic loss claims that can be brought is essential to balancing the economic loss doctrine with the need for tort protection.
C. Solutions to the Economic Loss Doctrine Problems in Kansas
Although the three cases left open the question of whether the courts would limit the doctrine in the same ways outside the home construction context, there is no indication that the courts are prepared to limit the doctrine in these ways now. Therefore, the most pressing problems arise in the residential construction context. home's foundation and walls and on non-compliance with a contractor's plans that caused problems with doors and foundations. 212 However, it is not clear in what other situations the courts would impose liability despite the economic loss doctrine. There likely is no easy answer or a clear bright line to help determine the types of claims that should be actionable in tort. But it still may be possible to define a narrow slice of cases in which it is appropriate to apply the discovery rule through tort law to extend the time in which a party can make a claim.
Kansas courts can help prevent scope of liability problems and better define the line between warranty and tort law by adopting several solutions. First, the Kansas courts should adopt the independent duty rule. Second, the courts can apply several factors to determine whether tort liability is appropriate in a given home construction economic loss case. These factors should include the gravity of harm that the defect causes, the bargaining positions of the parties, the nature of the source of the claim as a product or service, and whether the defect created a non-economic risk of harm. David, Coker, and Rinehart addressed the independent duty rule and almost all the factors listed above. 213 However, they did not expressly adopt these solutions in their analysis of tort liability for the claims. By adopting these solutions, the courts will be able to more easily determine which home construction economic loss claims are recoverable in tort and create a framework for analyzing tort liability in other economic loss contexts.
The Independent Duty Rule
Kansas courts can help prevent scope of liability problems in economic loss cases by adopting the independent duty rule, which has been adopted in Colorado and other jurisdictions. 214 As explained above, the independent duty rule bars tort liability when a defendant's duty can be traced to both a 212. David, 270 P.3d at 1104 (stating that the plaintiff sought damages "in order to bring the house into compliance with the plans, specifications and drawings that were originally agreed upon between the plaintiffs and defendant as the proper construction for [the] house"); Rinehart, 305 P.3d at 625 (explaining that the jury "determined Morton willfully misrepresented that the building complied with the plans and specifications and would include anchor bolts, roof fasteners, fire stops, a vapor barrier, and truss repairs"); Coker, 304 P.3d at 692-93.
213. David, 270 P.3d at 1113-14 (discussing the relative bargaining experience of the parties, the nature of the alleged harm, and the suitability of the economic loss doctrine to services contracts); Rinehart, 305 P.3d at 632 (discussing bargaining positions of parties); Coker, 304 P.3d at 695 (analyzing whether the plaintiff's claims arose independent of the parties' contract).
214. See Alma v. AZCO Const., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1264 (Colo. 2000) ("We hold that a party suffering only economic loss from the breach of an express or implied contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of care under tort law.").
contractual and common law tort source. 215 The reasoning behind this rule is that it helps define the line between warranty and tort law claims by analyzing the source of the duty. 216 Kansas courts should adopt the independent duty rule for three reasons. First, it provides a simpler way to determine which claims are appropriate for tort law analysis and those that are more appropriate for warranty law analysis. Second, it would help prevent the potential for unlimited liability in home construction cases by defining the scope of tort law. Finally, it has been recognized by Kansas courts and other jurisdictions as an effective way to distinguish tort and warranty claims.
The independent duty rule provides a simpler, more straightforward analysis than pure application of the economic loss doctrine. The economic loss doctrine, in its purest form, focuses on the damages a claimant seeks. 217 This may provide a starting point for analysis of whether a claim should be actionable in warranty or tort. 218 However, some claims, such as negligent misrepresentation, are pure tort claims but focus largely on economic losses. 219 The independent duty rule focuses on the source of the duty of the claim. 220 This allows courts to determine whether a claim sounds in contract or tort. Under the independent duty rule, if a claim arises independently in tort, outside the terms of a contract, it is actionable even if it seeks to remedy only economic losses. 221 Courts and commentators have consistently stated that the purpose of the economic loss doctrine is to help distinguish between tort and warranty claims. 222 The independent duty rule distinguishes between the two causes of action by locating the source of the duty without barring legitimate tort claims merely because they focus on economic losses.
Supreme Court recognized the merit of the rule, but did not expressly adopt the independent duty rule for all economic loss cases. 230 The court did, however, remand the case for consideration whether the tort claims arose independently from the parties' contract. 231 The David court recognized that the independent duty rule provided a similar analysis to the approach it had taken in other economic loss cases. 232 The Coker court also seemed to implicitly adopt this rule by requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of an independent duty to prevent application of the economic loss doctrine. 233 Although the Kansas Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted the independent duty rule, the Kansas courts have discussed the independent duty rule favorably and the rationales they have used are very similar to the independent duty rule. 234 Kansas courts should adopt the independent duty rule as a way to simplify the economic loss doctrine and avoid the potential for unlimited liability in home construction cases. The independent duty rule provides a straightforward approach to economic loss cases that focuses on the source of a warranty or tort duty rather than damages. The rule could also help prevent unlimited liability by making liability dependent on the plaintiff finding a duty outside the terms of the parties' contract. Kansas courts have already recognized the merits of the rule, and official adoption of the rule would help the economic loss doctrine adhere to its true function in distinguishing between tort and warranty claims. In addition to the independent duty rule, several factors may help in drawing distinctions between those home construction defects that should be actionable in tort and those that should be left to warranty law. None of these factors are determinative in themselves, but when taken together, they 230. David, 270 P.3d at 1109 (stating that the "independent duty analysis mirrors the rationale used by this court over several years to distinguish between causes of action arising in tort from those in contract in various types of litigation, including home construction"). App. 1998 )) (stating that the purpose of the doctrine is to establish "a logical demarcation between cases properly pursued as tort actions and those which are warranty claims").
provide the basis for an accurate analysis of the claims. First, courts should consider the risk of harm presented by the defect. 236 Courts should also consider the nature of the parties involved and their relative bargaining positions. 237 The distinction between services contracts and products claims may provide another basis for analyzing home construction defects. Finally, whether a defect that causes economic loss also creates a risk of noneconomic harm can provide another basis for distinction in home construction cases.
First, and perhaps most importantly, the courts should look to the gravity of the harm that the defect creates. 238 An analysis of the magnitude of harm could help prevent the potential for unlimited liability in these cases. There may simply be some harms in the home construction context that do not trigger the motivations of tort law in protecting parties outside the confines of the marketplace. 239 A plaintiff who brings an action based on the negligent fitting of a door and discovers this six years after construction of the home is sufficiently protected by warranty law. On the other hand, a claimant who discovers that her home's foundation has been gradually cracking because of negligent pouring of concrete may require the protection of tort law. Distinguishing between those claims that are serious enough to require tort law protection and those that are not is difficult, and it does not provide a basis by itself for determining when the doctrine should apply. But by weighing the gravity of harm that a home defect causes, courts may be able to apply the doctrine in the construction context with less of a risk for unlimited liability.
Another factor that might help distinguish which home defects should be actionable is the type of parties involved. As the courts suggested, the bargaining positions of the parties affect whether the economic loss doctrine should apply. 240 One of the policies supporting the economic loss doctrine is the promotion of bargaining between parties. 241 Courts have recognized that applying the doctrine in a business setting is beneficial because business parties generally share equivalent bargaining power. 242 As noted above in Part III.B.2.a, a distinction based on bargaining power is more necessary in the residential construction context than in the business context. 243 Similarly, in the construction context, a distinction based purely on whether the claimant is a consumer or business would not provide an adequate basis for determining whether to allow economic loss recovery. Businesses may have the same bargaining position as some homeowners, and, as in Rinehart, a party may fit into both categories. 244 However, by considering this factor along with the true bargaining positions of the parties, courts can better determine which home construction claims should be actionable in tort.
The distinction between products and services could also serve as an effective basis for determining whether the doctrine should apply. This is particularly relevant in the construction context, where a claim may involve both a product and a service. Other jurisdictions have adopted the services exception as a way to determine which claims should be actionable in warranty law and which should be actionable in tort. 245 Some jurisdictions, such as Wisconsin, apply the economic loss doctrine when a contract is predominantly for products rather than services. 246 This rule might provide a good starting point in the construction context. As noted above, the Kansas courts took this factor into consideration in preventing application of 240. See David, 270 P.3d at 1114 (citations omitted) (stating that one of the reasons for preventing application of the doctrine is that "contracts governing residential construction rarely involve the sophisticated parties with equal bargaining positions present in commercial products cases"). [I] f the contract is a mixed contract for products and services, whether the economic loss doctrine applies depends upon whether the contract is predominantly for a product or for services.").
the doctrine to home construction cases. 247 But when a home construction contract is based predominantly on goods, warranty law adequately addresses the economic loss claims through Article 2 of the UCC. Therefore, a determination of whether a claim is based on services or products could help in establishing a clearer line for when the economic loss doctrine should apply.
It might also be helpful for courts to consider whether a condition that creates an economic loss also creates a risk of non-economic harm. In the home construction context, some defective conditions do not create the risk of physical injury while others do create such a risk. For example, a door negligently installed that simply lets in cold air likely creates only economic loss. A negligently constructed roof may cause only economic loss when the leak is not significant. By contrast, a negligently constructed foundation may create a risk of physical injury if the walls of the house are capable of caving in. The David opinion addressed this factor in passing by stating its concern with contractors escaping tort liability simply because a dangerous condition coincidently causes only economic harm rather than personal injury. 248 Holding contractors liable for dangerous conditions when they cause economic harm may promote more careful construction and prevent injuries. If a condition has the potential for creating danger, a contractor would likely use greater care in its installation. The economic loss doctrine contemplates risk allocation for economic losses, but distinguishes this from personal injury claims, in which risk allocation is discouraged. 249 When a risk of bodily harm arises but only economic losses ultimately result, it seems that tort law would have an interest in deterring the allocation of the risk of bodily harm between the parties. The economic loss doctrine could still apply to claims that do not create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm.
The Kansas courts seemed to emphasize these factors in their analysis of the economic loss claims in front of them.
250 By incorporating these factors 247. As noted previously, warranty law seems to apply to service contracts with the duty to perform services in "a workmanlike manner," but Kansas courts may still have an interest in applying tort law to professional claims, which are not subject to this implied warranty. 250. David, 270 P.3d at 1113-14 (discussing the relative bargaining experience of the parties, the nature of the alleged harm, and the suitability of the economic loss doctrine to services contracts); Rinehart v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 305 P.3d 622, 632 (Kan. 2013) (discussing bargaining positions of parties).
into economic loss analysis in other home construction cases, the courts could allow tort recovery when it is appropriate while properly limiting the sphere of liability. None of these factors provides a suitable basis for analysis in itself, but taken together they might help prevent the potential for unlimited liability when the economic loss doctrine is repealed in home construction cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
The confusion surrounding the economic loss doctrine fuels innumerable applications of the doctrine throughout the United States. Some jurisdictions apply the economic loss doctrine in a wide range of contexts, effectively limiting plaintiffs to warranty claims when they seek economic loss damages. 251 Others have chosen from a menu of exceptions to help reign in the scope of the doctrine. 252 In Kansas, courts initially expanded the doctrine from products cases to construction and services claims.
However, David, Coker, and Rinehart explicitly limited the doctrine in at least some construction cases. Read broadly, these cases allow tort recovery for any economic loss claim in the home construction context when a plaintiff can find a legal duty outside the confines of the parties' contract. But this reading opens the door to tort liability in other economic loss contexts, blurs the line further between warranty and tort law, and creates the potential for unlimited liability in home construction cases. Therefore, courts must consider which home construction defects are worthy of additional protection outside of warranty law when the only harm caused is economic loss. By adopting the independent duty rule and applying several factors to economic loss doctrine analysis, the Kansas courts can prevent application of the doctrine in the most troubling home construction cases while also reasonably limiting the scope of tort liability in economic loss cases.
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